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Abstract
The need of protection and processing of the sensitive data in large scale data systems
(for example data derived from ﬁnancial systems, militaristic systems or social media
platforms) is a common problem. Usage of traditional cryptographic methods for data
protection mainly needs at least two of the ciphering, deciphering and data processing
works to be done on the same side. Because of this, with increase of the data size there
will be a need for higher processing power to work on the data.
Using traditional encryption algorithms for protection of the sensitive data on large scale
systems, also brings the need of exchanging the needed keys for protection and processing
the data. Homomorphic encryption schemes have enough ﬂexibility that, they should be
used on data systems that contains data from multiple parts, because of its feature of
allowing to process the encrypted data like its non-encrypted form.
With the usage of homomorphic encryption schemes and proper data learning systems
on encrypted data, distribution of sensitive data to diﬀerent parties can be done without
violating its privacy. In this thesis, we propose a method to run mathematical computations
which needs high processing power on a common platform which oﬀers high processing
power of data but not on parties that the sensitive data will be distributed. As a result
the partners of this systems will not need to have high processing power to function on
the data because the high processing demanding tasks would be done on the common
platform.
In this research Paillier Cryptographic system was used to protect data privacy. Paillier
Cryptographic algorithm's most prominent features are its asymmetrical and partially
homomorphic behavior. We proposed a system that uses privacy preserving distance
matrix calculation as input for several clustering algorithms which are commonly used
in machine learning systems. Our system is evaluated considering diﬀerent data lengths
and diﬀerent key lengths. Four diﬀerent data clustering methods have been tested. By
applying clustering algorithms on both encrypted and plain forms of the same data for
diﬀerent key and data lengths, we obtained performance results by using six diﬀerent
metrics.
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Homomorﬁk ifreleme Algoritmalar Kullanlarak Mahremiyet
Korumal Gruplandrma Yöntemlerinin Uygulanmas
smail Aydn
Öz
Günümüzde ﬁnans, sa§lk, askeri sistemler veya sosyal platformlarda elde edilmi³ ve
mahremiyeti korunmas gereken büyük veri topluluklarnn i³lenmesi/anlamlandrlmas
ihtiyac mevcuttur. Mahremiyet koruma amacyla klasik ³ifreleme yöntemlerinin kullanm,
verinin kullanlaca§ sistemde ³ifreleme, ³ifre çözme veya verinin anlamlandrlmas i³lemle-
rinin en az ikisinin ayn yerde yaplmasn gerektirir. Veri büyüklü§ünün artmas ile
beraber bu i³lemlerin ayn yerde yaplmas durumunda büyük miktarlarda bir i³lem gücü
ihtiyac do§acaktr.
Klasik anlamda kriptolama yöntemlerinin çok sayda ba§lant içeren büyük veri sistemle-
rinde kullanm durumunda, i³lem yüküne ek olarak çok sayda kullancnn her birinde
uygun anahtar da§tm mekanizmalarnn da çal³mas gerekecektir. Çok sayda kullancnn
bir araya gelmi³ oldu§u bir büyük veri sisteminde gerek anahtar da§tm mekanizmalarnn
ko³masnn, gerekse de büyük veri üzerinde yaplacak yüksek i³lem gücü gerektiren
i³lemlerin ortak bir platform üzerinde yaplmasna imkan vermesi sebebiyle bu çal³mada
homomorﬁk ³ifreleme yöntemlerinin kullanm önerilmektedir. Homomorﬁk ³ifreleme
yöntemleri ile beraber ³ifreli veri üzerinde uygun makine ö§renme yöntemleri kullanlmas
sayesinde büyük verilerin payda³lara da§tmnn ve veri i³lemenin mahremiyete aykr
bir durum olu³turmadan yaplabilmesi mümkün hale gelmektedir.
Bu sayede sistem payda³larnn yüksek i³lem kapasitesine sahip olmasna gerek kalmadan
büyük veri i³leme mekanizmalarna dahil olup, i³lem yapabilme imkanna sahip olmas
sa§lanacaktr. Tasarlanan sistemin çal³masna uygun olmas sebebiyle asimetrik bir
³ifreleme algoritmas olan ve homomorﬁk özellik göstermesi sebebiyle mahremiyet koruma
amacyla Paillier kriptolama sistemi kullanlm³tr. Makine ö§renme yöntemlerinin uygu-
lamas amacyla tasarlanan sistem üzerinde farkl veri uzunluklar, farkl anahtar uzunluk-
lar kullanlarak mahremiyeti sa§lanan sistemde 4 ayr makine ö§renme yöntemi ko³turul-
mu³tur. Her algoritmann farkl anahtar ve veri uzunlu§u için göstermi³ oldu§u performans,
ayn verinin açk ve kapal halleri üzerinde ko³turulan makine ö§renme algoritmalarnn
6 farkl ölçüt üzerinden de§erlendirmeye tutulmas ile tespit edilmi³tir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: Makine Ö§renimi, Kriptograﬁ, Homomorﬁk, Kümeleme
to all people who is in search of wisdom and who treats all branches
of science like their lost belongings while they keep on searching to
ﬁnd them. . .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a need for big data[1] systems that allows users to quickly handle sensitive data
which may be gathered from systems like healthcare systems or ﬁnancial systems and
without violating its privacy.
Machine learning[2] is gaining a high reputation for handling valuable and private data in
an eﬃcient way on big data systems. Sometimes big data systems contain data batches
related to systems that has diﬀerent privacy policies from each other but had to be
handled in a mutual way. Because of the diﬀerent privacy policies that diﬀerent parties
have, sensitive data can't be distributed everytime.
1.1 Current Situation
It is a hard question that How can sensitive data be distributed between multiple parties
without making concessions?. Classically to ﬁnd an answer to this question symmetric
and asymmetric (public-private key cryptography) ciphering algorithms[3] are being used.
The strength of classical cryptographic tools relies on secrecy of crypto key, strength of
the algorithm and randomness that used in algorithm.
When classical ways are appealed, ciphering - deciphering works and processing the open
data takes part in the same place. When it is desired to provide privacy using classical
cryptographic algorithms, the parties need to have proper key or keys from public-private
key pairs and the keys had to be transferred using a safe channel. As it is easy to see
using this type of traditional systems, brings the need to compute all processes that need
high processing power in the same place. Regrettably, this type of systems are being
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incapable for big data systems because classical cryptographic algorithms are mainly
designed for small datasets.
Data handling for machine learning algorithms while considering privacy[4] issues, primarily
has two main approaches;
Firstly; using the distinctive features of big datasets for the suppression and generalization
to sanitize the big data. After that, the sanitized version of data can be distributed[5, 6]
or published to data parties to run any machine learning algorithm.
Secondly, using cryptographically secure multi-party computation algorithms[79] to
construct protocols that can compute the same answer when obtained in private and
non-private cases. This approach is applied generally when the relationship between
data parties is symmetrical. Symmetrical relationship means that if the database is
partitioned and distributed to parties and result of the machine learning algorithms
applied to the dataset are same. So the result of the algorithm execution shows that
both parties learn the same output based on the joint database.
The diﬀerence between these two approaches is in the ﬁrst approach (sanitization approach),
the parties don't execute machine learning algorithms on the data which belong to
themselves and the database owner doesn't get an output of the execution. Depending on
the content and the quiddity of the data there might be a need to develop a classiﬁcation
model that allows to work just on a speciﬁc part of the data. To develop a classiﬁcation
model, compute-intensive processes would be used for sanitization without violating
privacy of the data. Big data classiﬁers need an eﬃcient for distributed learning and
privacy preserving protocol. The method we will suggest aims to allow a user to create
needed classiﬁers without reaching any extra information about the data. Therefore
database owner also wouldn't know anything about the data classiﬁer. Creating a data
classiﬁer by means of this method would be examined through a prototype application
and the performance will be observed. In this thesis, a framework will be proposed and
used for applying machine learning algorithms to datasets when it is distributed and
shared between parties. We will also use Paillier Cryptographic system for handling big
data.
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1.2 Contribution
In today's world the data which needs to be preserved privately can reach up to large
scales and may diﬀer in a wide range of varieties. There are several methods in literature
to provide privacy for these data. Applying classical cryptographic algorithms can't be
enough every time for handling privacy issues of large scale data. It is foreseen that
when a process needs to run on a sensitive dataset, it is not suitable every time to
send the encrypted data to diﬀerent parties. As classical cryptographic algorithms are
used for encryption, the needed processes can be executed on data only after decryption
of it. This way, although data privacy is highly violated for the side where the data
would be executed in, there are some mechanisms to solve this problem. Considering
their competence level, it is clear that this procedure can't be used in every condition.
In respect to this data privacy violation problem, there is always a necessity for a
system which can both allow to preserve privacy for data and doesn't violate privacy as
exposing the real data to irrelevant parties when needed process execution is performed.
In this thesis, a system that uses the Paillier Cryptography for classifying big data
systems and allows to handle/process the data without violating the privacy has been
proposed/designed. This proposed work can be implemented to any system that gathers
critical, sensitive or private information to run several processes on it. As mentioned
before, health care systems, militaristic systems, ﬁnancial-commercial systems or instant
private image/video processing systems. By changing used algorithms to process the
data or running diﬀerent algorithms rather than clustering algorithms, this model can
be modiﬁed to make the system suitable to handle diﬀerent needs. The proposed system
would allow to use the data properly while preserving the privacy of data.
The main contributions of this research are as follows:
• Overcoming the need to use actual sensitive data for data handling is achieved by
building a model that allows to use the distance matrix of the same data instead.
• The Paillier cryptosystem encryption-based clustering model building is proposed
for preserving privacy and thus private clustering model training is achieved.
• With usage of the distance matrix of sensitive data, clustering performance of
four diﬀerent clustering algorithms have been evaluated in respect of 6 diﬀerent
evaluation metrics and computational time.
• A system model has been oﬀered, which allows handling high processing power
demanding tasks to be done on a powerful platform. So that the overall computational
time aimed to be reduced thus it can be handled more eﬀectively.
Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Related Work
In this section we will examine works related to using machine learning algorithms which
depends on privacy preserving on big data systems.
Lindell Y. and Pinkas B., suggests a system which uses ID3 algorithm for data processing
safety. They have stated that their system needs relatively less communication rounds
and bandwidth. In this system, ID3 algorithm is used with decision tree learning and
while privacy of data is preserved diﬀerent users work on the data and then the results are
merged by using cryptographic protocols [10]. The main diﬀerence between our proposed
work and this work is the used cryptographic algorithm, ID3. Lindell Y. and Pinkas B.
also focused on the problem of secure multi-party computation on a joint database but,
their solution for privacy is using ID3 algorithm while the projected computation on the
database is decision tree learning.
Chaudhuri K. and Monteleon C., consider the balance between secrecy and learnability
while designing a privacy preserving algorithm for a database. They focus on privacy
preserving logistic regression algorithm. Bounding the sensitivity due to distortion is
measured when a noise is applied on the system while the regularized logical regression
algorithm is using a classiﬁer. A privacy-preserving regularized logistic regression algorithm
is provided which is based on solving a perturbed optimization problem [11]. In their
work they tried to construct a new learning method based on logistic regression to create
privacy preserving linear classiﬁers, which diﬀers from our work that we didn't preserve
privacy by our classiﬁers, but with an homomorphic encryption algorithm.
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Agrawal R. and Srikant R. state that in the future, data processing technics are going to
aim on merging diﬀerent security requirements on diﬀerent platforms. They evaluated
mathematical value of the distributed data to its original form and tried to accurately
estimate the true values of the original data from distributed ones [12]. In this work the
privacy is tried to be preserved by perturbing the original data by some randomization
techniques, diﬀerent from our proposed model. Also decision tree algorithms are used
for classiﬁcation of both original and reconstructed mutual data and these algorithms
are ByClass and Local. In our work the mutual data is not perturbed for privacy and
with this we also didn't need to reconstruct the original data.
Xu K. , Yue H. and their friends consider the traditional methods of cryptography for
parties that doesn't share open data in respect of adequation. Due to this problem, they
tried to minimize the data that needs to be processed with using the data locality feature
of Apache Hadoop architecture's Map Reduce for protecting the data privacy[13], which
is a big diﬀerence from our work that we oﬀer usage of a cryptographic protocol. While
the main focus of this work is similar to our study, the approach to ﬁnd a solution for
privacy preserving while handling big data is the main diﬀerence from our work because
we didn't consider a commercial platform's instruments to ﬁnd a solution but we tried to
oﬀer a general system without using any commercial platform. Also this work involves
Hadoop's another feature for getting local training results, Mapper. The data locality is
also a big diﬀerence from our proposed system because this work obliges the participants
of the system to handle their data locally, not on a common powerful platform. Also
because this system mainly runs on the Hadoop platform, participants must use their
data in HDFS (Hadoop Distributed File System) format.
Merugu S. and Ghosh J. examined the costs of security and communication of distributed
data in supervised and non-supervised scenarios. The suggestion they made is to transmit
the parameters of suitable generative models which built at local data sites to a central
database, instead of sharing the original data. The work showed that generating artiﬁcial
samples from the original data distributions with using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
techniques, it is mathematically possible to represent all the data with a mean model
[14]. In this work, privacy is preserved by the hardness of reconstruction of the original
data from the distributed model which is derived locally, no encryption algorithm is
used. This work also includes distributed model clustering between diﬀerent parties with
diﬀerent security concerns, so each party can choose a suitable expectation-maximization
algorithm to use for clustering and the central "model merger" tries to ﬁnd the best
solution for merging these clustering results. On the contrary of this work, in our work
we oﬀer a single data authority and the calculations are made on encrypted data because
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of its homomorphic characteristic and clustering is also not done in locals.
Shokri R. and Shmatikov V. tried to use the ability of gathering information and model
building of artiﬁcial neural networks from complex datasets. They tried to design a
practical system that allows diﬀerent parties to jointly learn an accurate neural network
model without sharing their input data. The researchers think that their system has a
strong privacy compared to any existing approach due to minimal data sharing which is
actually a small fraction of network parameters [15]. The usage of artiﬁcial intelligence
and actuating neural network algorithms are done on the client side and this is on of the
diﬀerences from our proposed model. Another diﬀerence is, this study oﬀers a model that
uses artiﬁcial intelligence which aims to work independent from the speciﬁc algorithm
which is used on training data. Also diﬀerent from proposed system, participants of
this system share their models with each other,so participants may also learn from other
participants' models.
Yang et al. oﬀer a system that allows users to use a model for calculating data frequencies
which also preserves privacy. The main logic of the system is to calculate the frequencies
of speciﬁc values or a group of values of client side's data at the data mining side and
while doing it data privacy is still protected by ElGamal cryptographic algorithm. It
has been stated that there is no information shared except frequency of data values [16].
This work is focusing mainly on the scenario that participants of the system doesn't want
to use the result of the data mining procedure which is the most prominent diﬀerence
from our proposed system that inn our system client wants to use the clustering result.
Another diﬀerence is thgis work also aims on calculating the frequencies of speciﬁc values
of the data of client side but, our model clusters data using certain clustering algorithms.
Sahin O.D. , Agrawal A. and El Abbadi A. oﬀer a system that guarantees the data of
a party which doesn't pertain to another data source won't be revealed. To provide
the privacy and build a distributed decision tree learning algorithm, ID3 algorithm and
Shamir's secret sharing are used [17]. Their work diﬀers from our model by the algorithm
used for privacy which is Shamir's secret sharing and the algorithm runs on the data
aiming to create decision trees which is ID3 algorithm. Diﬀerent from our work, this
work is proposing a non-homomorphic algorithm for data privacy and constrains the
client to use it three times successively on diﬀerent calculation phases, but we propose
a system model that uses homomorphic algorithm and the clustering algorithms run on
the encrypted data so encryption and decryption costs are signiﬁcantly lower.
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Li et al. suggest usage of multi key-fully homomorphic encryption as well as a hybrid
structure which combines double decryption with fully homomorphic encryption. They
tried to prove that these two privacy-preserving algorithms are proper to use with deep
learning algorithms over encrypted data. Diﬀerent users choose their keys and encrypt
their data. Encrypted data is sent on a cloud and the execution on the data is made by
these two suggested systems [18]. Diﬀerent from our model, this work mainly focuses on
the issue of collaborative deep learning. Also we use a classical encryption-decryption
routine in our model but in this work, to preserve privacy double decryption is oﬀered
not only to protect the data, but also to protect the model that every participant of the
system created from their data.
Yi X. and Zhang Y. considered a privacy preserving Bayes classiﬁer method for horizontal-
ly partitioned data and proposed two protocols. One of these protocols are two-party
protocol and the other one is a multi-party protocol. Multi-party protocol is used between
owners of sensitive data and a semi trusted server while two party protocol just broadcasts
the classiﬁcation result. In this work it is assumed that these two protocols are trusted
and can preserve privacy [19]. This study diﬀers from our proposed model by the used
classiﬁcation protocol which is naive Bayes classiﬁcation. While we propose a model that
preserves privacy by using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, Paillier cryptographic
system, this study aims for the same objective by enhancing the Bayes classiﬁcation
model oﬀered by Kantarcioglu and Vaidya.
Secretan J. , Georgiopoulos M. , Koufakou A. and Cardona K. approached the hardness
issue of developing a privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) algorithm. PPDM algorithm
are computationally intensive to execute and there is a need in the data mining that
developers need convenient abstraction algorithms for simpliﬁcation of the system. Diﬀer-
ent from our work, this study focuses on using parallel computing between diﬀerent
organizations and it is advised in their study because of its ability to bring high performance
and that can bear on the computationally intensive works of data mining. Their study
mainly considers a system built on the idea of in one tier a simpliﬁed use of cluster
and grid resources would exist and at another tier the system would just abstract the
communication for algorithm development [20]. This study mainly diﬀers from our
work by two reasons. Firstly, its main focus is trying to integrate a high performance
and parallel computing environment between diﬀerent organizations and secondly it
suggests usage of APHID (Architecture for Private and High-performance Integrated
Data mining) because of the lack of middleware frameworks that organizations would
need to support PPDM.
Chapter 3
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we will brieﬂy examine on data clustering, clustering methods, homomor-
phic encryption and Paillier Cryptosystem.
3.1 Data Clustering
Clustering can be described as dividing accumulated elements[21] into diﬀerent groups
depending on special features they have. Elements that are similar with each other
should be in the same group as much as possible. Same logic is a subject on clustering
algorithms aiming to work together with data mining algorithms.
Clustering analysis has been originally used in anthropology by Driver and Kroeber[22,
23] and then introduced to psychology by Zubin. So, clustering may be done using
diﬀerent methods due to diﬀerent needs and diﬀerent logical reasons with compliance to
several ﬂexibilities. Some of these methods can be described as,
Centroid-Based Clustering: Centralized clustering or centroid-based clustering[24, 25]
represents a group by a central vector which doesn't have to be a member of the dataset
it belongs. This method comes up with a problem: How many clusters there should
be? This question is the main drawback of data mining algorithms that depends on
this method (such as K-Means algorithm) and common approach to this problem is to
ﬁnd approximate solutions. After deciding cluster numbers, then central vectors for each
cluster is calculated by squared distances from the clusters to ﬁnd nearest elements to
form clusters. Due to this logic the squared distances from center should have their
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minimal value.
Distribution-Based Clustering: In this method elements of a big dataset is clustered due
to the statistical model they create[26]. Clusters can be deﬁned as elements belonging
most likely to the same distribution. This method can be considered as an excellent
method theoretically but it suﬀers a main problem known as over ﬁtting. One prominent
mixture model that is in use with this method is Gaussian mixture[27]. Dataset
is initially modeled with a Gaussian distribution randomly then the parameters are
optimized to ﬁt the dataset better. This will converge into an optimum model, so
iteration is needed to ﬁnd the best model. Distribution-based clustering models are
good for capturing correlation and dependencies between samples although it brings an
extra burden on the user in terms of iterative computing.
Density-based clustering: When clusters are deﬁned considering the areas of high density
of elements in a big dataset, that method is density based clustering[28, 29]. Methods
that use density-based clustering use diﬀerent criterion for deﬁning the density. One of
the most popular criterion is called as ′′density reachability′′ [30]. This logic works in
the way of searching for elements in a dataset which are within a certain threshold value
and adding those elements into a same cluster. There are diﬀerent algorithms that can
forms clusters according to same-density data and because of the working logic these
algorithms have they can form arbitrarily shaped clusters on the contrary of many other
clustering algorithms.
Connectivity-based clustering: This clustering method relies on the idea of clustering
logic which collects elements of a big dataset that are more related to nearby elements
than elements farther away and form a cluster[3133]. This method forms clusters
according to their distance, so a cluster can be described by the maximum distance needed
to collect elements. Diﬀerent clusters will form at diﬀerent distances, so this model can
be represented with a ′′dendrogram′′ [34] because these algorithms provide a hierarchical
model that within a certain model clusters also merge with each other. Distance values
that are in use for clustering can be calculated or selected due to diﬀerent needs. For
example distance that will be used for clustering can be minimum or maximum distances
between elements or average distances between them.
Diﬀerent clustering algorithms can be used according to the chosen clustering logic. In
our work, we analyzed four diﬀerent clustering algorithms in respect to diﬀerent logical
approaches which are described above and working procedure of these algorithms will be
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explained below together with the method they use while clustering a dataset.
3.1.1 K-Means Clustering
K-Means clustering method[35] creates clusters from a dataset according to previously
determined cluster number (n clusters) and while doing that, clustering is done in
according to have nearest ′′inertia′′ values for every cluster. Inertia value is calculated
as sum of squared distances between the central point of a cluster and every other point
inside the same cluster. This algorithm is generally useful for big datasets and is used
in many diﬀerent applications[36]. K-Means algorithm divides a set of N samples into
K disjoint clusters while cluster centroids are and the other points inside a cluster are
X. K-Means algorithm aims to choose centroids that minimize the inertia in accordance
with the equation of:
n∑
i=0
min(||x− µi||2) (3.1)
Inertia, or the within-cluster sum of squares, can be used to measure how internally
coherent clusters are. This criterion also suﬀers from several conditions. For example
it is usually assumed that the dataset is ′′complex′′ and ′′isotropic′′ but unfortunately
it isn't always the case, so it makes inertia ineﬃcient to elongated clusters or irregular
shaped datasets. Furthermore, while smaller values are better and the best case is when
the value is 0, on high-dimensional datasets Euclidean distances[37] tend to become
inﬂated. This situation is named as ′′curse of dimensionality′′. To speed up K-Means
algorithm and alleviate this problem, dimensionality reduction algorithms can be used
before running K-Means algorithm on a dataset.
To get the best clustering results, K-Means algorithm should run on the same dataset
multiple times[38]. Because of the need for high processing power and speed, we suggest
that computations such as these algorithms should run on a powerful cloud environment
to eliminate the case that users shall provide that much of processing power to the
system. After enough time, K-Means algorithm will always converge to a local minimum
value.
K-Means algorithm will initially create clusters by grouping elements around chosen
central points and according to inertia values of these clusters. As the iteration goes
on, algorithm shifts central points and re-group elements into clusters and calculate new
inertia to converge into a minimum value. As it easy to see, it is important to choose
accurate central points at the initialization of computing because more accurate cluster
centroids will signiﬁcantly reduce time or number of iteration to get better clustering.
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3.1.2 Hierarchical Clustering
Hierarchical clustering is a general name for certain clustering methods that builds nested
clusters by merging or splitting their elements. These clustering methods create clusters
with a logic similar to root-tree structure. The hierarchy of clusters can be represented
as a tree shape (dendrogram) while the roots of the tree represent clusters and leaves
represent only one sample that collect some clusters under itself.
Hierarchical algorithms can be expressed under two main titles, Agglomerative clustering
and Divisive clustering algorithms. In our work we used Agglomerative Clustering
method and this method works with a bottom-up approach like root to tree logic, unlike
Divisive clustering method. The way that Agglomerative clustering method will follow
for clustering depends on the clustering number which is predetermined and the method
the algorithm will use[39]. These methods are:
• Ward: For every group, calculation of inertia is an issue like in the K-Means
Clustering but usage of this value is diﬀerent from K-Means algorithm due to
structure of Agglomerative clustering. It aims to minimize the inertia diﬀerences
within all clusters.
dij = d({Xi}, {Xj}) = ||Xi−Xj||2 (3.2)
• Maximum or Complete Linkage: Clustering is done with consideration of minimizing
the maximum distances between diﬀerent clusters. While the distance between
clusters is d, the logic of this method can be described as:
max{d(x, y) : x ∈ A , y ∈ B} (3.3)
• Average Linkage: Minimizing the mean distance between pairs of clusters are used
for clustering. For example, while x and y represent points belonging to diﬀerent
clusters, the equation to calculate the mean distance between cluster A and cluster
B is as:
1
|A|.|B|
∑
x∈A
∑
y∈B
d(x, y) (3.4)
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3.1.3 Spectral Clustering
Spectral clustering mainly work on to embed the aﬃnity matrix between samples[40],
followed by a clustering algorithm. This method is especially eﬃcient on relatively small
datasets or if the aﬃnity matrix is sparse and the dataset is convex[41]. This algorithm
needs cluster number to be speciﬁed before working on the dataset.
3.1.4 Birch Clustering
Birch algorithm[42] builds a tree called the characteristic feature tree (CFT). CFT
structure consist of characteristic feature nodes (CFN) and these CFNs are made of
characteristic feature sub-clusters (CFS). With the information gathered from characte-
ristic feature sub-clusters, which is the subsidiary of CFT tree, there is no need to save
the entire data on the memory to create clusters from the dataset. Birch algorithm also
brings eﬀectiveness to memory use on the platform it runs and it is done by holding some
information about the dataset. Some of these informations are:
• Number of samples in a sub-cluster.
• Linear Sum: A n-dimensional vector holding the sum of all samples
• Centroids: This avoids recalculation of linear sum for n samples
• Squared Sum: Squared norm of the centroids.
Birch algorithm primarily needs two information to cluster the dataset. These are
threshold value which will be the radiant of clusters which puts a limit for clusters
and branching factor which deﬁnes maximum number of elements that every cluster can
have. Birch algorithm can only work on dataset after gathering these information. After
the clustering is done, if a new sample is inserted into the dataset, it is then merged with
most proper sub-cluster constrained by the threshold and branching factor conditions.
If the radius of the sub-cluster obtained after the merging the new sample and the
branching factor is exceeded, then a new space shall be allocated for this new sample. In
this condition the easiest solution to this can be splitting the most suitable cluster into
two (if it doesn't result in exceeding the cluster number) [43].
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3.1.5 Evaluation Metrics
3.1.5.1 Homogeneity
Homogeneity criteria can only be satisﬁed if members of each single class are placed into
a distinct cluster in terms of homogeneity[44]. So that each cluster signiﬁcantly contains
only members of a single class. The class distribution within each cluster should be done
from a single class. Homogeneity gets a value between 0 and 1. For a perfect clustering,
the homogeneity value gets the value 1.
As Y represents the data which belongs to the same class and T represents the clusters
that the data would be clustered into, homogeneity value can be expressed as H(Y |T ).
The value of H(Y |T ) is dependent on the size of the dataset. We use homogeneity value
by its normalized form by H(Y ) instead of its raw entropy value. While H(Y ) could
provide the maximum homogeneity value, this form can be expressed as;
(H(Y |T ))
(H(Y ))
(3.5)
In a perfect homogeneous situation, this normalization, (H(Y |T ))(H(Y )) equals to 0. Thus, as we
know that 1 is desirable and 0 is undesirable condition, the homogeneity can be deﬁned
as:
h =
1 ifH(Y, T ) = 01− H(Y |T )H(Y ) else (3.6)
Where a dataset that consists of N data points and these data points belongs to Y
number of classes which varies between c = 1, ..., Y and placed into T number of clusters
which varies between k = 1, ..., T . xck shows the number of data points belongs to the
class c and is also an element of cluster k. n shows the quantity of number of classes.
H(Y |T ) = −
|T |∑
k=1
|Y |∑
c=1
xck
N
log
xck∑|Y |
c=1 xck
H(Y ) = −
|Y |∑
c=1
∑|T |
k=1 xck
n
log
∑|T |
k=1 xck
n
(3.7)
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3.1.5.2 Completeness
This metric, which is symmetrical to the homogeneity metric, expresses the proportion
of data belonging to the same class within the same dataset[44]. If the data belonging
to the same data class is included in the same group as the result of the clustering of
the dataset, this metric which takes the ideal value in this situation regarded as 1, if the
grouping is farthest from ideal, the value of this metric will be 0.
In order to satisfy this criterion each of the clusters should comprise of elements which
belongs only one class. Distribution of cluster assignments within each class is used to
evaluate completeness. As Y represents the data which belongs to the same class and
T represents the clusters that the data would be clustered into, completeness value can
be expressed as H(T |Y ). In ideal condition H(T |Y ) = 0. The worst case scenario is
when each class is represented by each cluster and in this case H(T |Y ) = H(T ) = 1.
Completeness can be deﬁned as:
c =
1 ifH(T, Y ) = 01− H(T |Y )H(T ) else (3.8)
Where a dataset that consists of N data points and these data points belongs to Y
number of classes which varies between c = 1, ..., Y and placed into T number of clusters
which varies between k = 1, ..., T , ack shows the number of data points which is an
element of cluster k and is also belongs to the class c. n shows the quantity of number
of classes.
H(T |Y ) = −
|Y |∑
c=1
|T |∑
k=1
ack
N
log
ack∑|T |
k=1 ack
H(T ) = −
|T |∑
k=1
∑|Y |
c=1 ack
n
log
∑|Y |
c=1 ack
n
(3.9)
3.1.5.3 V-Measure
V-Measure is a criterion which measures how successfully did homogeneity and complete-
ness criteria have been satisﬁed[44].V-Measure is calculated by taking the harmonic mean
of the homogeneity and completeness metrics. This criterion takes values between 1 and
0. As described above in homogeneity and completeness sections, these two metric have
working logic that are opposite to each other. Increase in homogeneity results in decrease
in completeness, and vice versa. V-Measure can be calculated as:
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v −Measure = (2× homogenity × completeness)
(homogenity + completeness)
(3.10)
3.1.5.4 Adjusted Rand Index
A metric called ′′Rand Index′′ which is a measure of similarities between two data
clusterings, should be calculated in order to get ′′Adjusted RandIndex (ARI)′′[45].
While Rand Index may vary between 0 and 1, Adjusted Rand Index can also yield
negative values. Rand index which is calculated separately for both the clustering which
is expected to be ideal and the clustering that is currently made, and then these index
values are used in the formula below to ′′adjust′′ the Rand Index :
ARI =
(RI − E(RI))
(max(RI)− E(RI)) (3.11)
E(RI) shows the expected value which is a result of a set of calculations obtained from
a contingency table which is formed by amount of the objects of the dataset which had
been put in the same or diﬀerent clusters with the compared clusters.
Adjusted Rand Index gets its perfect score when the clustering is random and independent
of number of clusters, than the score would be 0. On the contrary if the clusters
are identical and/or similar to each other, then the index becomes 1. This metric is
symmetrical. So:
ARI(x, y) == ARI(y, x) (3.12)
3.1.5.5 Adjusted Mutual Information
This metric is also an adjusted metric like ARI. Mutual information tells us how
much information is shared between diﬀerent clusters and this metric measures this
information. So, adjustedmutualinformation [46] can be considered as a similarity
measure. In our work this metric measures the number of mutual elements between
diﬀerent clusters. This metric is equal to 1 when the clusters are completely identical,
and when clusters are independent from each other this metric becomes equal to 0. That
means there is no information shared. Adjusted Mutual Information is the adjusted form
of mutual information. The mutual information value is adjusted as below where U and
K are the clusterings which will be under the scope:
AMI(U, T ) =
I(U,K)− E(MI(U,K))
max(H(U), H(K))− E(I(U,K)) (3.13)
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E(MI(U,K)) shows the expected value which is a result of a set of calculations obtained
from a contingency table which is formed by amount of the objects of the dataset which
had been put in the same or diﬀerent clusters with the compared clusters.
This metric is also symmetrical like adjusted random information.
3.1.5.6 Silhouette Coeﬃcient
Silhouette coeﬃcient[47] is calculated by using both intra-cluster distance and mean
nearest-cluster distance which is the distance between a sample and the nearest cluster
that the element is not a part of for each of the elements in a dataset. The formula is:
Silhouette Coeff. =
(y − x)
max(x, y)
(3.14)
where y is the distance between an input instance and the nearest cluster which the
instance doesn't belong and x is the mean value of distances within the cluster which
the instance is a part of. To calculate the Silhouette coeﬃcient, the dataset should have
at least two clusters. This metric returns the mean value over all calculated Silhouette
coeﬃcient values for instances in dataset.
Silhouette coeﬃcient varies between -1 and 1. When this metric is considered for an
instance the more Silhouette coeﬃcient is closer to -1, the more likely the instance is in
wrong cluster. If this metric is considered for all dataset the more the value gets closer
to -1, the more clustering isn't accurate and instances are more likely misplaced and
clustering had put instances in clusters which they should not belong. On the contrary,
the more this metric gets closer to 1, the more likely the clustering is accurate. When
the value of this metric near 0, then probably clusters are overlapped.
3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption method that allows computation on
encrypted data and generates result which would have been same result if the same
computation would be performed on the plain data. As it can be seen from this
main property of the method, the purpose of the method is to preserve privacy[48
51] . Homomorphic encryption can also be used in connecting diﬀerent services without
exposing their sensitive data. Homomorphical encryption algorithms can be expressed in
two groups as partially homomorphic algorithms and fully homomorphic algorithms[52].
In our work, we used Paillier Cryptosystem and this is a additive partially homomorphic
algorithm[53].
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3.2.1 Paillier Cryptosystem
Paillier cryptosystem[54] is an asymmetric , probabilistic and public key cryptosystem.
It preserves privacy[55] depending on diﬃculty of the problem of computing the n-th
residue classes. Paillier cryptosystem is a additive partially homomorphic system, that
means encryption ofM1 andM2 plain datasets with a K public key gives the same result
as the encryption of addition of same two dataset (M1 +M2) with using the same K
public key. This encryption algorithm works by doing two main jobs in an order, ﬁrst
one is key generation and the second one is encryption/decryption of dataset.
As explained before Paillier Cryptographic system has homomorphic properties which
makes this algorithm more convenient to be used in several ﬁelds. These properties are:
• Addition of encrypted data: Result of adding of two encrypted datasets matches
with the result of enciphering and adding two datasets.
• Multiplication of encrypted data with a non-encrypted value: Multiplying an
encrypted data with a number N is same with multiplying the plain form of that
data with the same number N and encrypting it.
3.2.2 Floating Point Numbers
In this work, ﬂoating point numbers are used to express data which has been encrypted
using Paillier Cryptosystem in the python environment and to express the values in the
datasets we used in this work. As a natural consequence, the operations on the data are
also based on the values deﬁned in this type.
The number of digits in the fraction part of the data that is deﬁned as ﬂoating point
can be very large and if these numbers would be used than it would deﬁnitely cost more
processing power and processing time, so in this work only the ﬁrst 5 fractional digits
have been used. Because of the 5 digit limit has been put on the fractional digits of
input data and more than these digits are not used, which has been possibly generated
as a result of computational work, are rounded into 5 digits and this situation possibly
creates minimal data losses or deviation of computation [56]. It is seen that these eﬀects
on the calculation result depends on the grouping algorithm used, but overall it is low
in eﬀectiveness [57].
Chapter 4
System Model
4.1 Development Environment
In this thesis, Python 2017.3.3 community edition is used for algorithm programming
which encrypts data using Paillier cryptography and makes clustering using 4 diﬀerent
algorithms which have been described in section 3. Each algorithm run on a computer
which has Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700HQ CPU @ 2.60GHz octa core processor (4 real
+4 pseudo) along with 16GB of RAM. Parallel computing has not been used everytime
but while some algorithms allow to use all processor cores while running, that property
has been used.
4.2 Sequence Diagram
In this section, the system which is designed to preserve privacy while handling private
or sensitive data is explained by sequence diagrams. This system doesn't only aim
to preserve privacy, but also aims to handle the data eﬃciently in terms of time and
processing power.
4.2.1 Client Computaion
Client side doesn't hold the data which needs to be handled, because management and
maintenance of a big data storage brings unnecessary extra cost. In this work client of
this system is considered as an ordinary PC user, so there is no data storage for big data
systems on client side and the main task of client side is just using/handling sensitive
data when it is needed. The client generates public and private key pair by establishing a
18
Section 4. System Model 19
key exchange session with data authority, then sends its public key and asks for the data
needed. As the data needs to stay encrypted and not revealed to client,at this point,
data computing cloud starts to handle the data.
Data Computing cloud also doesn't store the sensitive data but preserves enough processing
power for handling the encrypted data. On computing cloud servers, the mathematical
computations run to compute an encrypted distance matrix from the encrypted data in
a form that can be used by the client. Cloud servers perform needed calculations for
client side without violating the data privacy and sends the results, which is in our case
the encrypted distance matrix. Client side then uses the encrypted matrix in order to
build a model and evaluate the data. As seen in Figure 4.1, in this system client side
doesn't need the actual data to use because enough information can be derived from the
distance matrix.
Data Authority
Data Producing
App.
Data Computing
Cloud
Calculation App.
Data Using
Environment
Client
M1: Generate Keys
Crypto Key(pub),
Key(priv)
M2: Key Exchange
CryptoKeypub
M3: Call for Encrypted Data(Xencm )
M4: Send Encrypted Data (Xencm )
M5: Calculate Enc. Distance Matrix
Hencm
M6: Send Distance Matrix (Hencm )
Figure 4.1: Sequence Diagram for Client Side
The pseudo code for Client Computation part of the system is shown in Algorithm
1. In key generation step, pseudo code doesn't contain explanation of step-by-step key
generation. As the Paillier key generation is a generic model, we didn't need to explain
those steps in details (choosing two prime numbers or choosing exponents etc.).
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Algorithm 1: Client Computation
1 begin
2 begin Key Generation & Key Exchange
3 (CryptoKeypub,Keypriv)← Key Generation
4 Send CryptoKeypub to Data Authority
5 Data Auth. ← CryptoKeypub
6 for m ∈ N do
7 begin Asking for Enc. Data
8 ask for (Xencm ) from Data Auth.
9 Data Auth. ← Client asks for (Xencm )
10 Data Comp. Cloud ← Data Auth. sends (Xencm )
12 begin Calculation of Enc. Dist. Matrix
13 send (Xencm ) to Data Auth.
14 Hencm is calculated ← from (Xencm )
15 Client ← Data Comp. Cloud sends (Hencm )
4.2.2 Data Authority Computation
In our work client doesn't has to maintain a storage big enough for handling big data,
as this condition is described in client computation section. Providing data storage
for the system is a responsibility for data authority (this was also described in client
computation section), but this is not the main duty. In this system data authority isn't
only the storage location, but also the sensitive data producer which encrypts and stores
the data as its main duty. In respect to our system design, there is no regulation that
forces the system to work with a single data authority. Instead, in reality, there should
be a large number of data authorities.
Data authority creates, stores and most importantly encrypts the data, with using the
keys gathered from the key exchange session conducted between itself and client side,
and sends the encrypted form of the data to data computing cloud as the client needs
to evaluate. In data authority side Paillier Cryptosystem is used as encryption scheme
and the key is the public key of client side. On this side, data privacy is preserved and
pure data isn't revealed to any part of the system. Encryption of pure data and its
transmission is done as explained in Algorithm 2 and it can be seen that pure data is
not revealed to any party, but just its encrypted form is transmitted to data computing
cloud as seen in Figure 4.2.
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Data Authority
Data Producing
App.
Data Computing
Cloud
Calculation App.
Data Using
Environment
Client
M1: Produce Sensitive Data
(X1 . . . Xn)
M2: KeyExchange
CryptoKeypub
M3: Encrypt(X,CryptoKeypub)
(Xenc1 . . . X
enc
n )
M4: Call for Encrypted Data(Xencm )
M5: Send Encrypted Data to Cloud (Xencm )
Figure 4.2: Sequence Diagram for Data Authority Side
Algorithm 2: Data Authority Computation
1 begin
2 begin Producing the Sensitive Data
3 Data Auth. ← (X1 . . . Xn) as n∈ N
4 begin Initiate Key Exchance Session with Client
5 Data Auth.← CryptoKeypub of Client
6 for n ∈ N do
7 begin Encryption of Sensitive Data
8 (Xenc1 . . . X
enc
n ) is calculated ← from ((X1 . . . Xn), CryptoKeypub)
10 begin Sending Encrypted Data to Data Comp. Cloud
11 Data Comp. Cloud ← (Xenc1 . . . Xencn )
4.2.3 Model Building at Client
In this work, the client side is just an ordinary PC user (as explained before). After
the encrypted distance matrix has been computed on Data Computing Servers, it is
sent to the client side. The distance matrix has enough knowledge to create a model
because of the Paillier Cryptosystem's specialty of homomorphic behavior. Once the
calculated distance matrix reaches to client side, it is decrypted by using the private key
of client. After considering which algorithm will be used in order to build the model,
that algorithm uses the decrypted distance matrix as input and the result is evaluated
as client side's will.
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As seen in Algorithm 3, the clustering algorithm should be determined every time at
the client side because predetermining the algorithm would be meaningless as every data
wouldn't possess same property and diﬀerent algorithms would satisfy diﬀerent needs.
As seen in Figure 4.3, client side receives just the encrypted form of distance matrix
and decrypts it using its private key. Evaluation of data starts just after deciding which
clustering algorithm will be used. Decrypted data enters into the clustering algorithm
and the result of the clustering process is a raw data on client side.
Output of the clustering process possesses valuable information that needs to be modeled
but at this point, client side will need extra info about contents of clusters to explain
them accurately and build up a meaningful model from them. This info can be gathered
by creating an extra session between client and data authority and asking to get it in a
form of a metric to interpret the clusterings.
In this system, this info can be gathered by client while the client calls for the encrypted
data from data authority so the info can be gathered with the needed data. As a second
method, this information can also be gathered by establishing an extra session with
data authority after the clustering process. This information must be asked from data
authority, not from computing cloud because it is not a trusted party and its only job is
to overcome the diﬃculty of making computations on encrypted data. This info is also
as sensitive as the data itself and must be delivered in encrypted form.
Data Authority
Data Producing
App.
Data Computing
Cloud
Calculation App.
Data Using
Environment
Client
M1: KeyExchange
CryptoKeypub
M2: Call for Encrypted Data(Xencm )
M3: Send Enc. Data to Cloud (Xencm )
M4: Calculate Dist. Matrix
(Hencm )
M5: Send Dist. Matrix (Hencm )
M6:Decrypt(Hencm ,KeyPriv)
Hm
M7: Model Building&Evaluation
Figure 4.3: Sequence Diagram for Model Building at Client Side
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Algorithm 3: Model Building at Client
1 begin
2 begin
3 Client ← (CryptoKeypub, Keypriv)
4 Data Auth.← Client asks for (Xencm )
5 for m ∈ N do
6 begin Calculation of Enc. Dist. Matrix
7 Data Comp. Cloud ← Data Auth. sends (Xencm )
8 (Hencm ) is calculated ← from (Xencm )
9 Client ← (Hencm ) from Data Comp. Cloud
10 for m ∈ N do
11 begin Decryption of Distance Matrix
12 (Hm) is calculated at Client← from (Hencm ,Keypriv)
13 begin Model Building at Client
14 Clustering Algorithm ← (Hm)
15 Client← Clustered Pure Data
Chapter 5
Experiments and Results
In this work, clustering methods which have been described in section 3 have been studied
by running each of them on 10 diﬀerent datasets (from 500 to 5000 rows) with using 5
diﬀerent bit lengths of keys. Datasets are produced/chosen diﬀerent from each other
by their data and data lengths. The computer used in our experiments has limited
computational capacity to calculate distance matrix especially when 512 and 1024 bit
long keys are used on data which has more than 5000 rows. The data length of each
dataset is also the name of the dataset (dataset 500, dataset 1000 etc.) and used key
lengths vary between 64 bit and 1024 bits.
Experimental results have tables which include evaluation metric scores under the name
of ′′Plain/Encrypted domain clustering results′′ based on the chosen dataset and
domain. Plain data results have same time result for each key length , because for
plain domain encryption there is no calculation using a key. Evaluation metrics have
(except silhouette coefficient) maximum scores because of the used data is artificial
and not real.
All algorithms have been run on python environment (as explained in section 4.1.) and
all algorithm codes have been modiﬁed to create same number of clusters (20 clusters)
from given data. Just in the case of Birch Algorithm on ﬁgures that show distribution
of clusters, number of clusters is as 19, because the cluster numbers are varying between
0 and 19.
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5.1 Plaintext Results
5.1.1 K-Means Algorithm Results
From Table 5.1 to 5.10 and Figure 5.1 to 5.10 we will see the distribution of plain data
which its length varies between 500 and 5000 due to K-Means algorithm. K −Means
algorithm forms clusters considering distances between points. This algiorithm is used
generally when the data that needs to be clustered has ﬂat geometry, creating too many
clusters is not necessary and created clusters are even sized.
Table 5.1: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.362 9.844827
Figure 5.1: Plain domain clustering for dataset 500
Table 5.2: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.350 36.957112
Figure 5.2: Plain domain clustering for dataset 1000
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Table 5.3: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.359 86.728137
Figure 5.3: Plain domain clustering for dataset 1500
Table 5.4: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.352 163.580145
Figure 5.4: Plain domain clustering for dataset 2000
Table 5.5: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.346 271.935549
Figure 5.5: Plain domain clustering for dataset 2500
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Table 5.6: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.338 413.855393
Figure 5.6: Plain domain clustering for dataset 3000
Table 5.7: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.338 623.065649
Figure 5.7: Plain domain clustering for dataset 3500
Table 5.8: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.345 1048.278932
Figure 5.8: Plain domain clustering for dataset 4000
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Table 5.9: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.349 1292.195140
Figure 5.9: Plain domain clustering for dataset 4500
Table 5.10: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 5000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.340 1292.195140
Figure 5.10: Plain domain clustering for dataset 5000
5.1.2 Hierarchical Algorithm Results
From Table 5.11 to 5.20 and Figure 5.11 to 5.20 we will see the distribution of plain data
which its length varies between 500 and 5000 due to Hierarchical algorithm. Hierarchical
algorithm forms clusters considering pairwise distances between points. This algiorithm
is used generally when creating too many clusters is necessary and there are possible
connectivity constraints to form clusters.
Table 5.11: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.295 2.297151
Figure 5.11: Plain domain clustering for dataset 500
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Table 5.12: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.287 14.892210
Figure 5.12: Plain domain clustering for dataset 1000
Table 5.13: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.276 53.347093
Figure 5.13: Plain domain clustering for dataset 1500
Table 5.14: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.285 123.057987
Figure 5.14: Plain domain clustering for dataset 2000
Section 5. Experiments 30
Table 5.15: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.305 223.921661
Figure 5.15: Plain domain clustering for dataset 2500
Table 5.16: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.297 410.769117
Figure 5.16: Plain domain clustering for dataset 3000
Table 5.17: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.298 606.139748
Figure 5.17: Plain domain clustering for dataset 3500
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Table 5.18: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.296 964.552434
Figure 5.18: Plain domain clustering for dataset 4000
Table 5.19: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.294 1206.877016
Figure 5.19: Plain domain clustering for dataset 4500
Table 5.20: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 5000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.304 1592.067019
Figure 5.20: Plain domain clustering for dataset 5000
5.1.3 Spectral Algorithm Results
From Table 5.21 to 5.30 and Figure 5.21 to 5.30 we will see the distribution of plain
data which its length varies between 500 and 5000 due to Spectral algorithm. Spectral
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algorithm forms clusters considering nearest − neighbors. This algiorithm is used
generally when the data that needs to be clustered has non-ﬂat geometry, creating many
clusters is not necessary and created clusters are even sized.
Table 5.21: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.309 4.687996
Figure 5.21: Plain domain clustering for dataset 500
Table 5.22: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.320 8.625928
Figure 5.22: Plain domain clustering for dataset 1000
Table 5.23: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.288 16.470525
Figure 5.23: Plain domain clustering for dataset 1500
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Table 5.24: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.300 26.471610
Figure 5.24: Plain domain clustering for dataset 2000
Table 5.25: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.304 39.410522
Figure 5.25: Plain domain clustering for dataset 2500
Table 5.26: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.289 53.833924
Figure 5.26: Plain domain clustering for dataset 3000
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Table 5.27: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.301 71.788992
Figure 5.27: Plain domain clustering for dataset 3500
Table 5.28: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.296 98.604372
Figure 5.28: Plain domain clustering for dataset 4000
Table 5.29: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.294 121.950676
Figure 5.29: Plain domain clustering for dataset 4500
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Table 5.30: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 5000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.310 148.259339
Figure 5.30: Plain domain clustering for dataset 5000
5.1.4 Birch Algorithm Results
From Table 5.31 to 5.40 and Figure 5.31 to 5.40 we will see the distribution of plain data
which its length varies between 500 and 5000 due to Spectral algorithm. Birch algorithm
forms clusters considering Euclidean distance between points. This algiorithm is used
generally when the data that needs to be clustered is large and data reduction in respect
to outlier removal is needed.
Table 5.31: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.334 2.984673
Figure 5.31: Plain domain clustering for dataset 500
Table 5.32: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.299 15.079737
Figure 5.32: Plain domain clustering for dataset 1000
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Table 5.33: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.299 42.676480
Figure 5.33: Plain domain clustering for dataset 1500
Table 5.34: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.289 96.952344
Figure 5.34: Plain domain clustering for dataset 2000
Table 5.35: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.294 213.186763
Figure 5.35: Plain domain clustering for dataset 2500
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Table 5.36: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.294 347.996374
Figure 5.36: Plain domain clustering for dataset 3000
Table 5.37: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.282 525.583719
Figure 5.37: Plain domain clustering for dataset 3500
Table 5.38: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.261 795.867486
Figure 5.38: Plain domain clustering for dataset 4000
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Table 5.39: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4500
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.287 1106.477862
Figure 5.39: Plain domain clustering for dataset 4500
Table 5.40: Plain domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 5000
Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 0.276 1509.153672
Figure 5.40: Plain domain clustering for dataset 5000
5.2 Encrypted Domain Results
5.2.1 K-Means Algorithm Results
From Table 5.41 to 5.50 and Figure 5.41 to 5.50 we will see the distribution of encrypted
data which its length varies between 500 and 5000 due to K-Means algorithm. K−Means
algorithm forms clusters considering distances between points. This algiorithm is used
generally when the data that needs to be clustered has ﬂat geometry, creating too many
clusters is not necessary and created clusters are even sized.
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Table 5.41: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.787 0.778 0.783 0.615 0.745 0.362 31.094117
128 0.855 0.838 0.846 0.738 0.814 0.362 36.25088
256 0.855 0.838 0.846 0.738 0.814 0.362 56.539257
512 0.855 0.838 0.846 0.738 0.814 0.362 201.91177
1024 0.741 0.724 0.732 0.488 0.705 0.350 1124.906108
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.41: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 500
Table 5.42: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.768 0.742 0.755 0.542 0.724 0.350 125.628153
128 0.741 0.724 0.732 0.488 0.705 0.350 144.886491
256 0.741 0.724 0.732 0.488 0.705 0.350 228.416989
512 0.741 0.724 0.732 0.488 0.705 0.350 725.917815
1024 0.741 0.724 0.732 0.488 0.705 0.350 4186.542025
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.42: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 1000
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Table 5.43: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.811 0.802 0.807 0.691 0.794 0.359 293.46373
128 0.905 0.897 0.901 0.863 0.892 0.359 334.0554
256 0.905 0.897 0.901 0.863 0.892 0.359 523.392246
512 0.905 0.897 0.901 0.863 0.892 0.359 1682.56815
1024 0.905 0.897 0.901 0.863 0.892 0.359 8325.129793
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.43: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 1500
Table 5.44: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.834 0.815 0.824 0.753 0.809 0.352 488.452087
128 0.811 0.793 0.802 0.720 0.786 0.352 535.880552
256 0.811 0.793 0.802 0.720 0.786 0.352 849.303891
512 0.811 0.793 0.802 0.720 0.786 0.352 2994.485032
1024 0.811 0.793 0.802 0.720 0.786 0.352 15613.316685
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.44: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 2000
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Table 5.45: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.807 0.778 0.793 0.662 0.773 0.346 688.117421
128 0.773 0.766 0.769 0.607 0.759 0.346 785.466996
256 0.773 0.766 0.769 0.607 0.759 0.346 1226.975066
512 0.773 0.766 0.769 0.607 0.759 0.346 4152.607761
1024 0.773 0.766 0.769 0.607 0.759 0.346 23101.712638
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Figure 5.45: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 2500
Table 5.46: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.736 0.720 0.728 0.528 0.714 0.338 1014.156519
128 0.743 0.727 0.735 0.543 0.721 0.338 1157.243526
256 0.743 0.727 0.735 0.543 0.721 0.338 2056.959974
512 0.743 0.727 0.735 0.543 0.721 0.338 5541.251946
1024 0.743 0.727 0.735 0.543 0.721 0.338 34827.048195
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.46: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 3000
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Table 5.47: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.810 0.791 0.800 0.685 0.787 0.338 1457.896283
128 0.835 0.822 0.828 0.745 0.819 0.338 1586.997932
256 0.835 0.822 0.828 0.745 0.819 0.338 2471.958513
512 0.835 0.822 0.828 0.745 0.819 0.338 7559.3366
1024 0.835 0.822 0.828 0.745 0.819 0.338 42589.211932
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.47: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 3500
Table 5.48: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.776 0.762 0.769 0.623 0.758 0.345 1823.396682
128 0.795 0.781 0.788 0.671 0.788 0.345 2109.998674
256 0.795 0.781 0.788 0.671 0.788 0.345 3194.871339
512 0.795 0.781 0.788 0.671 0.788 0.345 10375.714473
1024 0.795 0.781 0.788 0.671 0.788 0.345 56810.999143
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.48: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 4000
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Table 5.49: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.696 0.686 0.691 0.465 0.682 0.349 2872.369434
128 0.763 0.747 0.755 0.585 0.744 0.349 3251.606473
256 0.763 0.747 0.755 0.585 0.744 0.349 4154.388187
512 0.763 0.747 0.755 0.585 0.744 0.349 14540.128381
1024 0.763 0.747 0.755 0.585 0.744 0.349 74140.224168
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.49: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 4500
Table 5.50: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 5000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.746 0.733 0.740 0.574 0.730 0.340 3306.081361
128 0.766 0.751 0.759 0.604 0.748 0.340 4061.713102
256 0.766 0.751 0.759 0.604 0.748 0.340 6257.986052
512 0.766 0.751 0.759 0.604 0.748 0.340 15636.902162
1024 0.766 0.751 0.759 0.604 0.748 0.340 93672.799487
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.50: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 5000
Section 5. Experiments 44
Figure 5.51: Charts that show change of each evaluation metrics score by data length
for diﬀerent key lengths and for K-Means Algorithm
Figure 5.52: Calculation Time Graph for KMeans Algorithm on Key-Data Length
Dimensions
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5.2.2 Hierarchical Algorithm Results
From Table 5.51 to 5.60 and Figure 5.52 to 5.61 we will see the distribution of encrypted
data which its length varies between 500 and 5000 due to Hierarchical algorithm. Hierarchical
algorithm forms clusters considering pairwise distances between points. This algiorithm
is used generally when creating too many clusters is necessary and there are possible
connectivity constraints to form clusters.
Table 5.51: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.788 0.732 0.759 0.475 0.693 0.295 18.986376
128 0.769 0.723 0.745 0.449 0.682 0.291 22.642983
256 0.786 0.742 0.764 0.482 0.704 0.296 40.160459
512 0.768 0.724 0.745 0.448 0.683 0.289 145.019023
1024 0.796 0.748 0.771 0.493 0.711 0.312 853.861069
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.53: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 500
Table 5.52: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.714 0.662 0.687 0.419 0.639 0.287 83.323777
128 0.705 0.656 0.680 0.422 0.632 0.272 97.465241
256 0.708 0.661 0.684 0.422 0.638 0.272 167.564546
512 0.739 0.679 0.708 0.453 0.657 0.296 579.170437
1024 0.727 0.671 0.698 0.429 0.649 0.277 3534.103834
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Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.54: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 1000
Table 5.53: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.706 0.661 0.683 0.431 0.646 0.276 196.051964
128 0.741 0.712 0.726 0.507 0.699 0.303 228.930361
256 0.723 0.689 0.705 0.468 0.675 0.265 390.931864
512 0.748 0.717 0.732 0.512 0.704 0.280 1317.826500
1024 0.706 0.731 0.719 0.496 0.693 0.286 10427.998650
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.55: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 1500
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Table 5.54: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.680 0.661 0.670 0.390 0.650 0.285 367.038711
128 0.735 0.715 0.725 0.528 0.706 0.294 428.576449
256 0.722 0.706 0.714 0.504 0.696 0.306 725.576526
512 0.747 0.728 0.737 0.540 0.719 0.298 2329.031204
1024 0.706 0.717 0.712 0.490 0.696 0.299 14633.003870
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.56: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 2000
Table 5.55: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.686 0.648 0.667 0.389 0.639 0.305 613.736580
128 0.727 0.713 0.720 0.505 0.706 0.302 710.651168
256 0.716 0.692 0.704 0.470 0.685 0.288 1398.371611
512 0.711 0.699 0.705 0.479 0.691 0.301 4549.038970
1024 0.711 0.724 0.717 0.494 0.703 0.274 21740.579705
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.57: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 2500
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Table 5.56: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.695 0.664 0.679 0.442 0.657 0.297 1165.375747
128 0.703 0.675 0.689 0.452 0.668 0.301 1270.462384
256 0.703 0.675 0.689 0.428 0.669 0.295 2163.898116
512 0.699 0.670 0.684 0.454 0.663 0.292 6722.317208
1024 0.673 0.702 0.687 0.455 0.666 0.271 34352.033333
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.58: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 3000
Table 5.57: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.715 0.682 0.698 0.476 0.676 0.298 1334.015664
128 0.712 0.690 0.701 0.474 0.684 0.300 1544.466207
256 0.713 0.688 0.700 0.462 0.682 0.296 2373.623768
512 0.717 0.689 0.703 0.470 0.683 0.307 7435.351474
1024 0.703 0.680 0.691 0.456 0.674 0.289 43162.416905
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.59: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 3500
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Table 5.58: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.713 0.684 0.698 0.454 0.679 0.296 1856.406278
128 0.644 0.688 0.665 0.392 0.638 0.264 2839.123717
256 0.641 0.688 0.664 0.384 0.636 0.264 3254.513282
512 0.659 0.703 0.680 0.407 0.654 0.264 9928.278455
1024 0.646 0.689 0.667 0.389 0.640 0.264 58259.589612
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.60: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 4000
Table 5.59: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.615 0.659 0.636 0.348 0.609 0.253 4582.444243
128 0.691 0.710 0.700 0.486 0.686 0.274 2785.228748
256 0.674 0.696 0.684 0.442 0.669 0.274 5738.454688
512 0.684 0.708 0.696 0.461 0.680 0.274 12611.520444
1024 0.675 0.701 0.688 0.457 0.671 0.274 75562.476217
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.61: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 4500
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Table 5.60: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 5000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.627 0.665 0.645 0.361 0.622 0.250 4082.753650
128 0.639 0.673 0.655 0.390 0.635 0.245 4321.325598
256 0.654 0.686 0.670 0.405 0.649 0.245 5737.903436
512 0.634 0.659 0.646 0.360 0.629 0.245 15691.378081
1024 0.651 0.680 0.665 0.401 0.646 0.245 90506.861951
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.62: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 5000
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Figure 5.63: Charts that show change of each evaluation metrics score by data length
for diﬀerent key lengths and for Hierarchical Algorithm
Figure 5.64: Calculation Time Graph for Hierarchical Algorithm on Key-Data Length
Dimensions
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5.2.3 Spectral Algorithm Results
From Table 5.61 to 5.70 and Figure 5.63 to 5.72 we will see the distribution of encrypted
data which its length varies between 500 and 5000 due to Spectral algorithm. Spectral
algorithm forms clusters considering nearest − neighbors. This algiorithm is used
generally when the data that needs to be clustered has non-ﬂat geometry, creating many
clusters is not necessary and created clusters are even sized.
Table 5.61: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.880 0.876 0.878 0.756 0.857 0.312 27.473035
128 0.874 0.871 0.872 0.714 0.852 0.301 32.294984
256 0.886 0.880 0.883 0.762 0.862 0.317 55.222464
512 0.897 0.892 0.894 0.793 0.876 0.310 148.256260
1024 0.874 0.868 0.871 0.730 0.849 0.318 1907.164346
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.65: Enrypted domain results for dataset 500
Table 5.62: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 1000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.843 0.858 0.851 0.713 0.833 0.262 97.614100
128 0.816 0.818 0.817 0.640 0.804 0.285 117.100256
256 0.842 0.848 0.845 0.694 0.832 0.291 219.221150
512 0.815 0.819 0.817 0.646 0.803 0.284 770.700724
1024 0.823 0.822 0.822 0.644 0.810 0.295 3458.167745
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Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.66: Enrypted domain results for dataset 1000
Table 5.63: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 1500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.768 0.763 0.765 0.575 0.753 0.259 167.661065
128 0.806 0.803 0.805 0.641 0.795 0.275 204.724721
256 0.834 0.826 0.830 0.691 0.819 0.286 368.695161
512 0.811 0.811 0.811 0.674 0.803 0.269 1318.623197
1024 0.788 0.783 0.785 0.591 0.773 0.275 7844.362055
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.67: Enrypted domain results for dataset 1500
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Table 5.64: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 2000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.785 0.791 0.788 0.630 0.778 0.247 292.515220
128 0.820 0.827 0.823 0.668 0.814 0.271 358.194028
256 0.822 0.829 0.825 0.676 0.816 0.273 646.240033
512 0.833 0.840 0.836 0.707 0.828 0.270 2298.568044
1024 0.841 0.848 0.845 0.730 0.836 0.271 13878.686489
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.68: Enrypted domain results for dataset 2000
Table 5.65: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 2500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.777 0.784 0.780 0.616 0.772 0.261 591.294237
128 0.816 0.820 0.818 0.685 0.812 0.289 714.742061
256 0.799 0.803 0.801 0.636 0.795 0.286 1289.402599
512 0.829 0.832 0.831 0.710 0.825 0.289 4808.001379
1024 0.806 0.806 0.806 0.665 0.801 0.291 23225.882568
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.69: Enrypted domain results for dataset 2500
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Table 5.66: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 3000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.699 0.725 0.712 0.502 0.693 0.217 698.578957
128 0.792 0.800 0.796 0.622 0.788 0.273 807.522692
256 0.837 0.837 0.835 0.710 0.830 0.277 1427.103635
512 0.817 0.821 0.819 0.678 0.813 0.269 5333.425660
1024 0.814 0.820 0.817 0.688 0.810 0.266 31492.537981
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.70: Enrypted domain results for dataset 3000
Table 5.67: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 3500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.704 0.739 0.721 0.503 0.699 0.221 943.595023
128 0.755 0.763 0.759 0.553 0.751 0.270 1104.710917
256 0.760 0.767 0.764 0.563 0.756 0.270 1963.394550
512 0.795 0.798 0.797 0.633 0.792 0.270 6978.438284
1024 0.766 0.772 0.769 0.576 0.763 0.270 45285.358207
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.71: Enrypted domain results for dataset 3500
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Table 5.68: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 4000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.783 0.802 0.792 0.626 0.779 0.245 1192.235111
128 0.780 0.782 0.781 0.591 0.776 0.284 1464.420077
256 0.777 0.780 0.779 0.579 0.774 0.281 3012.274721
512 0.766 0.770 0.768 0.556 0.762 0.283 11371.570717
1024 0.777 0.780 0.778 0.576 0.773 0.283 56022.390935
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.72: Enrypted domain results for dataset 4000
Table 5.69: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 4500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.783 0.788 0.786 0.609 0.780 0.275 1470.769980
128 0.766 0.770 0.768 0.580 0.763 0.276 2437.502503
256 0.820 0.824 0.822 0.702 0.818 0.291 3236.176361
512 0.812 0.819 0.815 0.666 0.810 0.284 11463.184758
1024 0.792 0.794 0.793 0.632 0.789 0.289 81526.500912
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.73: Enrypted domain results for dataset 4500
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Table 5.70: Enrypted domain clustering results with dataset 5000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.695 0.728 0.711 0.494 0.691 0.216 1816.478657
128 0.788 0.794 0.791 0.611 0.786 0.289 2205.573661
256 0.793 0.799 0.796 0.625 0.791 0.288 4031.744384
512 0.806 0.813 0.809 0.648 0.804 0.280 14343.408337
1024 0.792 0.798 0.795 0.621 0.790 0.288 96517.342535
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.74: Enrypted domain results for dataset 5000
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Figure 5.75: Charts that show change of each evaluation metrics score by data length
for diﬀerent key lengths and for Spectral Algorithm
Figure 5.76: Calculation Time Graph for Spectral Algorithm on Key-Data Length
Dimensions
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5.2.4 Birch Algorithm Results
From Table 5.71 to 5.80 and Figure 5.74 to 5.83 we will see the distribution of encrypted
data which its length varies between 500 and 5000 due to Spectral algorithm. Birch
algorithm forms clusters considering Euclidean distance between points. This algiorithm
is used generally when the data that needs to be clustered is large and data reduction in
respect to outlier removal is needed.
Table 5.71: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.754 0.686 0.718 0.474 0.647 0.325 19.439627
128 0.754 0.686 0.718 0.474 0.647 0.325 23.486909
256 0.754 0.686 0.718 0.474 0.647 0.325 41.035640
512 0.754 0.686 0.718 0.474 0.647 0.325 143.734250
1024 0.754 0.686 0.718 0.474 0.647 0.325 1048.355556
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.77: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 500
Table 5.72: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.735 0.610 0.667 0.427 0.588 0.292 83.829280
128 0.735 0.610 0.667 0.427 0.588 0.292 128.729702
256 0.735 0.610 0.667 0.427 0.588 0.292 175.842091
512 0.735 0.610 0.667 0.427 0.588 0.292 580.245359
1024 0.735 0.610 0.667 0.427 0.588 0.292 3977.079074
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Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.78: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 1000
Table 5.73: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 1500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.698 0.595 0.642 0.367 0.580 0.271 211.437032
128 0.698 0.595 0.642 0.367 0.580 0.271 238.995674
256 0.698 0.595 0.642 0.367 0.580 0.271 424.972714
512 0.698 0.595 0.642 0.367 0.580 0.271 2658.128383
1024 0.698 0.595 0.642 0.367 0.580 0.271 8180.718817
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.79: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 1500
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Table 5.74: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.706 0.569 0.630 0.364 0.557 0.282 372.510162
128 0.706 0.569 0.630 0.364 0.557 0.282 547.822752
256 0.706 0.569 0.630 0.364 0.557 0.282 1275.947787
512 0.706 0.569 0.630 0.364 0.557 0.282 4679.906635
1024 0.706 0.569 0.630 0.364 0.557 0.282 14160.692468
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.80: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 2000
Table 5.75: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 2500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.723 0.562 0.632 0.363 0.553 0.297 663.725682
128 0.723 0.562 0.632 0.363 0.553 0.297 876.060204
256 0.723 0.562 0.632 0.363 0.553 0.297 1158.569366
512 0.723 0.562 0.632 0.363 0.553 0.297 3739.838171
1024 0.723 0.562 0.632 0.363 0.553 0.297 23466.670509
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.81: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 2500
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Table 5.76: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.735 0.543 0.625 0.353 0.535 0.272 1091.686250
128 0.719 0.520 0.603 0.296 0.511 0.267 1415.069280
256 0.719 0.520 0.603 0.296 0.511 0.267 3687.206187
512 0.719 0.520 0.603 0.296 0.511 0.267 5497.333181
1024 0.719 0.520 0.603 0.296 0.511 0.267 39601.765869
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.82: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 3000
Table 5.77: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 3500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.722 0.547 0.622 0.334 0.540 0.260 1574.051378
128 0.722 0.547 0.622 0.334 0.540 0.260 1822.918705
256 0.722 0.547 0.622 0.334 0.540 0.260 2367.135811
512 0.722 0.547 0.622 0.334 0.540 0.260 10418.645935
1024 0.722 0.547 0.622 0.334 0.540 0.260 42655.888462
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.83: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 3500
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Table 5.78: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.716 0.539 0.615 0.381 0.532 0.273 1876.723837
128 0.721 0.533 0.613 0.363 0.527 0.271 2154.585296
256 0.721 0.533 0.613 0.363 0.527 0.271 3222.278868
512 0.721 0.533 0.613 0.363 0.527 0.271 9963.323332
1024 0.721 0.533 0.613 0.363 0.527 0.271 56957.615504
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.84: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 4000
Table 5.79: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 4500
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.712 0.559 0.626 0.391 0.553 0.251 2452.598178
128 0.680 0.529 0.595 0.297 0.523 0.256 2818.579733
256 0.680 0.529 0.595 0.297 0.523 0.256 4270.994490
512 0.680 0.529 0.595 0.297 0.523 0.256 13707.474558
1024 0.680 0.529 0.595 0.297 0.523 0.256 81720.847180
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.85: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 4500
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Table 5.80: Encrypted domain evaluation metric scores for dataset 5000
Key Hom. Comp. V-Measure Adj.Rand. Adj. Mut. Inf Silh. Cﬀ. Time (s)
64 0.714 0.601 0.652 0.422 0.596 0.250 3156.384398
128 0.723 0.581 0.644 0.373 0.577 0.245 3498.406328
256 0.723 0.581 0.644 0.373 0.577 0.245 7191.104841
512 0.723 0.581 0.644 0.373 0.577 0.245 16862.456699
1024 0.723 0.581 0.644 0.373 0.577 0.245 90333.516413
Clustering done using 64 Bit Key Clustering done using 128 Bit Key Clustering done using 256 Bit Key
Clustering done using 512 Bit Key Clustering done using 1024 Bit Key
Figure 5.86: Encrypted domain clustering results for dataset 5000
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Figure 5.87: Charts that show change of each evaluation metrics score by data length
for diﬀerent key lengths and for Birch Algorithm
Figure 5.88: Calculation Time Graph of Birch Algorithm on Key-Data Length
Dimensions
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5.3 Results
Computations made on encrypted data are done in more time than plain data as expected.
As the key size changes, computational time also changes proportionally in case of
encrypted data computation, but in case of plain data computation time only changes
by the change of data size.
Considering all six evaluation metrics and time, we oﬀer usage suggestions for each
clustering algorithm to run them in the most eﬃcient way, while we deﬁne the eﬃciency
in this work as better scores on evaluation metrics and stronger key usage.
For all algorithms that we examined, it is possible to suggest usage of 1024 bit key
for all of them as evaluation metrics have high enough scores, but when it comes to
computational time it is clearly not eﬃcient enough. Using 1024 bit key takes almost six
times longer computational time than using 512 bit key. As almost all evaluation scores
are close to each other in case of using 1024 bit and 512 bit keys, computational time for
using 512 bit key is clearly more manageable than using 1024 bit key.
Only Birch and Hierarchical algorithms need slightly less computational time than others
while using 1024 bit key, so it is possible to suggest 1024 bit key for these algorithms,
just in case of running these algorithms on a more powerful processor than we used in
this work or, on the same processor but in the way of parallel computation.
Tables that show evaluation scores of plain data computations indicates that working on
the plain data would get perfect evaluation scores except silhouette coeﬃcient. Although
the silhouette coeﬃcient doesn't get the perfect score, it is already so close that it can
be considered as 0,5. In this work, this case is resulted because we used artiﬁcial data
which produced on python environment by the function of ”make blobs”, instead of a
real data. In terms of real data, evaluation metrics can't get perfect scores for all cases
and probability of getting perfect scores for real data is very low.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
Data privacy holds an important place on on-line systems and diﬀerent kinds of data
brings more sensitivity that needs to be evaluated. As the need for handling sensitive
data and increase of data sizes bring an important need to build eﬃcient systems for both
privacy preserving and eﬃciency on computation. In this work we examined four diﬀerent
clustering algorithms in terms of six diﬀerent evaluation metrics and computational time.
Each algorithm brings out relatively similar results, but in detail they have diﬀerences.
Using our proposed model evaluation scores of clustering models of plain domain and
encrypted domains are quite similar which means that conversion from ﬂoating point
numbers to integer creates negligible diﬀerences between each clustering algorithm.
In this work plain data is artiﬁcial data, not real. So the data has already been produced
due to a mathematical logic. This situation caused the clustering of plain domain to get
perfect scores. In real world with using real data, this case won't be occurred because the
real data won't be a result of a certain mathematical logic but instead it will be random
data. So studying with real data would give more similar results to evaluation scores of
encrypted domain. Therefore if the real data and its encrypted forms can be used in a
future study, observation results for clustering algorithms will be more accurate.
Our proposed model preserves privacy for only training phase of clustering algorithms
using encrypted and distributed datasets. The client builds ﬁnal clustering model with
aggregation of each encrypted distance matrix calculated at each party. As a result, the
ﬁnal model is in plain domain and some information such as cluster centroids are plain.
If the client wants to share the model then some information leakage may occur.
As a future work, in order to prevent data leakage from the model, also the model
should be encrypsted using homomorphic encryption algorithms. In order to encrypt the
model, the cluster centroids should be encrypted. The system that we oﬀer with this
work, doesn't possess the ability to use encrypted cluster centroids while creating models
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from clustered data. To allow the client to use the encrypted clustering model, a new
system model must be developed.
Based on the properties of the data, client side may need extra information about the
clustered data to explain it accurately and describe the model they create. So as an
another future work, gathering that extra information from data authority can be studied
about. That information gathering should work without violating the data privacy,
should eliminate the need of having a data scientist at data authority to create a metric
(which will be used to discover contents of clustering results) and doing these without
putting on extra processing load onto the client side shall be studied.
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